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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

TS-0007/AP-C1

27 JAN 1966

SUBJECT: Request for SNIE (U)

TO:

Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505

1. (TS) The Secretary of Defense has requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to secure an interagency intelligence assessment of the probable effects of the resumption of air operations against North Vietnam with a substantial expansion in scope over past operations. Specifically he desires the assessment to estimate the probable effects of adoption of the courses of action, summarized in the enclosure, on the NVN capability to support the insurgency in SVN.

- 2. (TS) With respect to the infiltration of men and materiel, it is desired that the assessment estimate when the effect of such operations would have an impact in SVN, and to what degree over a selected time frame. The assessment should also take into account probable effects of complete adoption of the proposals on the one hand, and on the other, adoption of all measures except the harbor blockade (mining).
- 3. (S) It is desired that this estimate be prepared, as a matter of urgency.

JOSEPH F. CARROLE Lieutenant General, USAF

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Director

1 Enclosure a/s

cc: Chairman, JCS

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COURSES OF ACTION

- 1. Air operations against North Vietnam are resumed with expanded scope and intensity: to deny to NVN assistance from external sources; to destroy in depth those resources already in NVN that contribute most to the support of aggression; to destroy or deny the use of all known permanent military facilities; to harass and disrupt dispersed military operations; and to harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and materiels through southern DRV into Laos and SVN. The steps to be taken are:
- a. Interdict land lines of communication from China and close the ports, including mining.
- b. Destruction of all known POL bulk and dispersed storage, distribution, and transportation systems.
- c. Destruction of all large military facilities in northern DRV.
- d. Denial of electric power facilities to begin at an early date and continue until all plants are out of action. Complete destruction is not required.
- e. An intensified armed reconnaissance program, without sortie limitation, to harass, disrupt, and attrite the dispersed military facilities south of 20 degrees which have been identified and are continuing to be identified as a result of detailed intelligence analysis. Day and night air operations would be concentrated on LOC centers, predicted traffic flow areas, transshipment points, vehicle/boat concentrations, and LOC exits from the DRV.
- 2. To provide for the security of our forces during the above air operations, constant surveillance of the airfields would be maintained and their destruction undertaken whenever interference with our planned air operations, or offensive air actions against our military forces in SVN is initiated. Further, the DRV SAM threat would be dealt with, as required, to prevent interference with planned air operations.

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